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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4385 
___________ 
 
RUBEN CUEVAS,  
      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-00043) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Lisa Pupo Lenihan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 1, 2014 
 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 4, 2014 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 Federal prisoner Ruben Cuevas appeals pro se from the District Court’s August 
21, 2013 order granting summary judgment in favor of the Government in this Federal 
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) action.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
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I. 
 Cuevas brought this FTCA action alleging medical negligence after he fell and 
broke his foot while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Loretto, 
Pennsylvania.  He alleged that the breaks went undiagnosed for several months, and that 
he had not received the surgery that he believes is necessary to properly mend his foot. 
 This case was previously before us a few years ago.  See Cuevas v. United States, 
422 F. App’x 142 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  At that time, the District Court had  
(1) denied Cuevas’s motion for counsel, and (2) granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Government because he had not filed a Certificate of Merit (“COM”) pursuant to 
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3.
1
  We vacated the court’s judgment and 
remanded for further proceedings.  We explained that the court’s sole basis for denying 
                                              
1
 Rule 1042.3 requires that, in any malpractice action, the plaintiff file a COM stating that 
 
(1) an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written 
statement that there exists a reasonable probability that the 
care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the 
treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the 
complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards and 
that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm, or 
  
(2) the claim that the defendant deviated from an acceptable 
professional standard is based solely on allegations that other 
licensed professionals for whom this defendant is responsible 
deviated from an acceptable professional standard, or 
 
(3) expert testimony of an appropriate licensed professional is 
unnecessary for prosecution of the claim. 
 
Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.3(a) (notes omitted). 
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Cuevas’s counsel motion  — that there were a “paucity of attorneys willing to take on pro 
bono cases” — could not be determinative on its own, and we instructed the court to 
“continue to attempt to obtain counsel for Cuevas.”  Cuevas, 422 F. App’x at 145.  We 
also directed the court to consider in the first instance whether the COM requirement 
“actually represents a point of substantive Pennsylvania law” (such that it applies to this 
federal action).  Id. at 146. 
 The day after our decision, the District Court placed the case in “administrative 
suspense” and directed the District Court Clerk to recruit a lawyer for Cuevas.  Over the 
next several months, the Clerk recruited three attorneys to represent Cuevas.  Each 
attorney declined, and these declinations are memorialized on the District Court’s docket 
by three sealed documents.  In September 2011, the District Court ordered the Clerk to 
reopen the case and cease efforts to find counsel.  The court explained that 
[b]ecause of the reasons given for the declinations, which 
were filed under seal and will not be delineated here, and the 
fact that a reasonable effort has been made to locate counsel 
to no avail, the Court does not see any utility in continuing in 
its efforts to find counsel for Plaintiff. 
   
(Supplemental App. at 12 (emphasis added).)  In that same order, the court (1) directed 
the parties to submit briefing on the applicability of the COM requirement, and  
(2) granted Cuevas an extension of time to file a COM.  
 In October 2011, we held in Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 
264-65 (3d Cir. 2011), that Pennsylvania’s COM requirement is substantive law and must 
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be applied as such by the federal courts.  In light of that decision, the District Court 
rescinded its directive to submit briefing and gave Cuevas 90 more days to file a COM.  
Cuevas then submitted a motion in which he argued that the District Court’s September 
2011 order violated our directive on the counsel issue.  He also requested that he be 
provided with the sealed declinations so that he could “make an independ [sic] judgment 
on whether these attorneys have violated their ethical standards.”  The court denied the 
motion to the extent it sought appointment of counsel or access to the sealed declinations, 
but it granted Cuevas additional time to locate counsel on his own. 
 In the months that followed, Cuevas was given additional time to both secure 
counsel and file a COM.  In June 2012, Cuevas, still without counsel, filed his COM.  
Therein, he certified, pursuant to Rule 1042.3(a)(3), that expert testimony was not 
necessary in his case.  The Government then moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
his claim failed because such testimony was, in fact, necessary. 
 On August 21, 2013, the District Court granted the Government’s motion.  The 
court determined that, because “the medical issues presented in this case are not within 
the range of experience and comprehension of non-professional persons,” “expert 
testimony is needed to prove Plaintiff’s claim of medical negligence.”  (Supplemental 
App. at 131.)  Because Cuevas’s COM certified that expert testimony was not necessary, 
the court concluded that Cuevas “is bound by this certification and now prohibited from 
offering such testimony absent exceptional circumstances.”  (Id. at 132.)  Finding no 
exceptional circumstances, the District Court held that summary judgment in favor of the 
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Government was appropriate. 
 Cuevas now appeals, challenging the District Court’s handling of the counsel issue 
on remand and its August 21, 2013 grant of summary judgment.
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review a 
district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the 
district court.”  S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2013).  
Summary judgment is appropriate when the “movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Although “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and 
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor in determining whether a genuine 
factual question exists, summary judgment should not be denied unless there is sufficient 
evidence for a jury to reasonably find for the non[-]movant.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. 
Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
We review the District Court’s handling of the counsel issue for abuse of discretion.  See 
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1993).    
  We begin with the counsel issue.  A district court may only ask, not compel, an 
attorney to represent a litigant who is unable to afford counsel.  See 28 U.S.C.  
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 Although Cuevas’s notice of appeal was not docketed until 78 days after the District 
Court entered its judgment, the parties agree that he submitted that notice to prison 
authorities for forwarding to the District Court within the 60-day appeal period prescribed 
by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B).  Accordingly, this appeal is timely.  
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§ 1915(e)(1); Brightwell v. Lehmann, 637 F.3d 187, 191 n.5 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 
Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989)).  In Tabron, we 
took note of the “significant practical restraints” on a district court’s ability to appoint 
counsel under § 1915:  “the ever-growing number of prisoner civil rights actions filed 
each year in the federal courts; the lack of funding to pay appointed counsel; and the 
limited supply of competent lawyers who are willing to undertake such representation 
without compensation.”  6 F.3d at 157.  We expressed “no doubt that there are many 
cases in which district courts seek to appoint counsel but there is simply none willing to 
accept appointment.  It is difficult to fault a district court that denies a request for 
appointment under such circumstances.”  Id. 
 Here, the District Court, on remand, made a concerted effort to obtain an attorney 
for Cuevas.  Unfortunately, each of the three recruited attorneys declined.  The court’s 
decision to stop searching at that point was not necessarily problematic.  What was 
potentially problematic was the fact that the court explicitly based that decision, in part, 
on the reasons given in the attorney declinations while, at the same time, refusing to share 
those reasons with the parties. 
 To be sure, there was no need for the court to unseal the declinations themselves.  
Nor would it have been appropriate to disclose the names of the recruited attorneys.  But 
without giving any indication as to why those attorneys declined, the District Court 
erected a barrier to meaningful review of its decision. 
                                                                                                                                                  
See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). 
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 Despite that, we need not remand again.  We have examined the attorney 
declinations and believe it is necessary to disclose the reasons (and only the reasons) 
given in those declinations.  One attorney declined because of his/her full-time 
commitment to non-legal employment.  Another attorney declined because of his/her 
caseload, and noted that he/she had been “unable to identify other counsel in [his/her] 
office with the capacity to represent the plaintiff at this time.”  The third attorney 
declined because he/she had investigated the case and believed that it lacked merit.  
Having considered these reasons and the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude 
that the District Court abused its discretion when it called off the search for counsel. 
 We now turn to the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in the 
Government’s favor.  Pursuant to Liggon-Redding, Cuevas was required to file a COM.  
He eventually did so, invoking Rule 1042.3(a)(3) and asserting that no expert testimony 
was necessary.  For substantially the reasons given by the District Court, we agree with 
the court that expert testimony was, in fact, necessary, and that Cuevas’s decision to 
proceed under subsection (a)(3) prohibited him from presenting such testimony.  
Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Government. 
 In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s August 21, 2013 
judgment.
3
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 Cuevas has moved for reconsideration of a June 2, 2014 order issued by the Clerk of 
this Court, which took no action on his untimely opposition to the Government’s motion 
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to supplement the appendix.  Cuevas’s motion is denied.  We note that, even if we were 
to consider that opposition, the outcome of this appeal would not change. 
